America and Human Capital Formation in Communist Europe
Aspirations, Reactions and Results

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Abstract: This paper analyses the Ford Foundation’s 1957 to 1961 intellectual exchange program in Poland. Emerging in the novel context of Washington’s emphasis on cultural diplomacy and Warsaw’s exceptional position in the East Bloc following October 1956, the Foundation’s program was the earliest complex scholarly initiative by a US organization aimed at Europeans under Communist rule. Consequently, for a brief window of time, the Foundation was able to operate an unprecedentedly open exchange under uniquely liberal terms. The program’s genesis and operations will be explained, as well as the reasons for its abrupt suspension and its long-term implications. In particular, I will argue that through the program, the Foundation played a significant role in rebuilding and shaping the social sciences in post-Stalinist Poland.

Keywords: Cold War, Cultural Diplomacy, Ford Foundation, Intellectual Exchange, USA, Poland.

Introduction

It is notable, that when the American sociologist Daniel Bell published his book entitled The End of Ideology in 1960, the reality on the ground in the United States and elsewhere in the West was that of a vigorous re-politicizing of a generation. The unfortunate timing aside, however, Bell’s book presented an important idea, which was that highly industrialized societies, capitalist and communist alike, would eventually converge on a path towards specialized, technocratic rule (Bell, 2001). If higher education was becoming increasingly relevant both East and West of the Iron Curtain in the 1950s, this was because both Capitalists and Socialists envisioned a new class rising to political prominence in response to an expanding, technologically advanced, industrial sector.

This paper does not directly attend
to the question of how authoritarian governments of East Central Europe remodeled and updated higher education to correspond with the requirements of a centralized economy. Instead, I intend to show how the United States attempted to shape the future elites of East Central Europe with the hope that a professional, non-ideological class of highly educated individuals would lead the socialist economies towards a systemic convergence with Capitalism. Focusing on the People’s Republic of Poland, I hope to illustrate the attitude of the Polish government towards higher education through its reaction to offers put forward by the Americans.

**Setting the Stage for Cultural Diplomacy**

The Ford Foundation received a ‘strictly confidential’ note from the State Department dated 22 October 1955, proposing ‘that direct bilateral negotiations with the satellite regimes on [the subject of exchange] be started without waiting for the consent of the government of the Soviet Union’ (Ford Foundation Archives, 22 October 1955, R1062, G57-477). In response, the Ford Foundation proposed an ‘intellectual Marshall Plan’ for the East Bloc (Pollak, 1980). It envisioned replacing ideologically bound social sciences with those based on empirical and practical methodologies, representative of American neopositivist thought.

The 1956 events in Poland and Hungary jump-started the program. The Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in November led to a refugee crisis. Shepard Stone was in Vienna at the time, and immediately pushed for an emergency fund to aid the homeless and penniless Hungarian exiles. Stone was an internationalist who had worked for the US High Commission in West Germany before joining the Ford Foundation. From the Austrian capital, he could bear witness to the implications of the Polish October; indeed, the Hungarians had originally adopted the slogans of their northern neighbours. In contrast to the events in Budapest, the thaw that had begun in Poland in 1954 resulted in a reorganization of power that marginalized the Stalinists while offering the promise of democratization, with a broad easing of censorship to show for it. This liberalization created an opportunity for the Foundation to enter Eastern Europe (Machcewicz, 2009).

In February 1957, Stone made a nine-day trip to Poland to explore the feasibility of a potential exchange program. He had planned to keep a low profile, conscious of the volatile situation in the country. However, as he reported immediately upon his return to New York, the Poles made this impossible, with the press announcing the arrival of a Ford Foundation representative. The significance of this was by no means lost on the American, who noted that ‘the Polish Government had evidently made up its mind that, Russia notwithstanding, they wanted the Polish people to know that American foundations were welcome in Poland’. Stone was invited to meet with top government officials, including Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz. Some of them, including Minister of Education Władysław Bienkowski, spoke directly for First Secretary Władysław Gomułka when they expressed their enthusiasm for the Foundation’s
initiative. Stone was also unexpectedly granted a meeting with the influential Catholic Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, who insisted that help ‘is essential and urgent and that [the Ford Foundation] should act immediately’ (FFA, 1957, R2519, G57-322).

**Engineering an Exchange**

Throughout the early months of 1957, Stone’s office eagerly followed Congressional deliberations concerning the provision of economic aid to Poland (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477). The initiation of official negotiations between the two countries regarding US credit for the Gomułka regime was important for the International Affairs Office. It mollified anxieties of the Board of Trustees, worried that the foundation may be labelled ‘soft on communism’ by the domestic Right (New York Herald Tribune April 17, 1957). On 26 April 1957, the President of the foundation addressed the subject of ‘Private Philanthropy in American Life’, in which he announced a grant of $500,000 for a yearly ‘program in Eastern Europe, specifically for projects related to Poland, to enable outstanding Polish professors and scholars in the social sciences, economics, architecture, and other fields to establish or renew contacts with Western colleagues and to gain knowledge of Western developments, primarily by study in the United States and in Western Europe’ (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477). This was an almost word-to-word list of the needs voiced by the Poles Stone had spoken with in February of that year.

The Ford Foundation’s status as an apolitical non-governmental organization, independent from Washington, was crucial to its effectiveness. A statement from 1954 noted that ‘in working abroad . . . a foundation cannot become a mere tool of government policy, or it will certainly end by compromising both the government and itself’ (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477). However, when it came to establishing a program behind the Iron Curtain, the Foreign Office had the last word. Key members of the State Department received a detailed account of Stone’s first trip to Poland immediately upon his return (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477). In a telephone call to Stone, the State Department bluntly stated that the Foundation’s priorities in developing East European programs should be, in order of importance, ‘Poland; Yugoslavia; Soviet Union; Rumania; Czechoslovakia’ (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477).

**Operations in Poland**

An intricate component of the Polish exchange was the selection of candidates. Traditionally, the Foundation did not directly participate in the selection process for its various scholarship programs; it specified qualifications, but did not designate recipients. But the historic nature of the first program behind the Iron Curtain convinced Stone to take a more active role in choosing individual participants. The Foundation wanted to ensure that beneficiaries would be receptive to everything the scholarships were meant to offer (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477). It is telling of the climate in Poland in the months Gomułka was consolidating his grip
on power, which the authorities agreed to leave the selection process to the Americans.

Throughout the program’s duration, Stone and his aides made several trips each year to Poland to manage candidate review and selection. They compiled a tentative annual list of recipients based on petitions sent by aspiring candidates, as well as from tips from various sources. A list issued by the Ministry of Higher Education (MHE) was diligently reviewed but not binding. Stone and his associates also tapped a growing network of contacts in Poland and abroad for recommendations, such as Jerzy Giedroyc, the editor of the Paris-based Polish émigré monthly Kultura. The Foundation could not reveal the source of these ‘many valuable suggestions’ to the Polish authorities, yet at this early stage, the American’s list often overlapped with that of the Ministry, which Stone saw as a sign of ‘the overall good intentions of the Polish officials’ (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477).

For a Pole awarded a grant, numerous formalities lay ahead. Travel west involved the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (MIA) Passports Bureau. Each application was also approved by the MIA’s First Department, which handled intelligence (Pleskot in Franaszek, 2010). In the process, the MIA combined its administrative function with its role as the safeguard of state ideology, pressuring candidates to supply information. In response, Stone asked the MHE and Central Committee (CC) member Adam Schaff to ‘inform the police that one subscription to the New York Times would provide them with more information than all visiting Poles to the USA’ (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477). This squib missed the point, however, as the authoritarian regime was much more interested on spying on its own citizens abroad.

There were two reasons for the exceptional relaxation of enforcement, which nevertheless enabled scholars at the time to travel without signing loyalty slips for the MIA: the de-Stalinization of the previous years meant that the old repressive apparatus had been purged and its prerogatives limited (Kemp-Wlech, 2008), and the liberalization culminating in October 1956 left the newly advanced cadres uncertain of the future political climate, and therefore relatively restrained (Wiatr, 2010). Overall figures regarding temporary travel to capitalist countries support this theory. In 1955, around 4700 passports were issued; in 1957, the number exceeded 77000. The next decade marked another dip in numbers, suggesting that a ‘window of opportunity’ was brief but real (Stola, 2010).

Reshaping the Landscape of Sociology

In its first fiscal year of operation, 1957-1958, the IA’s Polish exchange program sent fifty leading Polish intellectuals west. Of these, 23 travelled to the US, 15 to the UK, and the remainder to France (7), West Germany (1), Switzerland (3), and Sweden (1) (FFA 1957, G57-477). Sociologists were frequent recipients of Ford grants, providing a much-needed boost to a discipline that had suffered in Poland. Banned as a bourgeois science under Stalinism, it was only recently being
re-established in universities. As things stood, sending sociologists west was exceptionally beneficial both for the Poles, eager to learn contemporary methods, and the Americans, who were keen to share these methods. A partial list of sociologists who travelled to the US included names such as Stanisław and Maria Ossowscy, Józef Chałasiński, Julian Hochfeld, Stefan Nowak, Irena Nowakowa, Jan Strzelecki, or Jerzy Wiatr. Zygmunt Bauman chose England; Antonina Kłosowska went to France. In the US, Polish sociologists most frequently headed to Columbia University, where Paul Lazarsfeld’s and Robert Merton’s Bureau of Applied Social Research made it the centre of empirical sociology. Other sociologists went to the University of Chicago, the University of California at Berkeley, and the University of Michigan (Sułek, 2009).

In early 1958, Lazarsfeld took a ten-day trip to Poland organized by the Ford exchange. Hearing the news of his arrival, Maria Ossowska remarked that he was ‘sent by Stone, as an expert responsible for checking up on the progress of Sociology in Poland’. Although this was a tongue-in-cheek remark, it nevertheless reflects how strongly the scholarship program influenced the social sciences (Ossowska, 2002). During his stay, Lazarsfeld was ‘in intense contact with the work and the discussions of nearly all the Polish sociologists, their staffs, and some of their students’. In addition, meetings were held with some of the economists, philosophers, and political scientists (FFA, 1958, R2521, G57-322). Lazarsfeld also delivered a lecture entitled ‘The American School of Sociology’ (Kraśko, 2010). Summing up the results of his stay to Polish colleagues, Lazarsfeld assured them that ‘both sides will benefit from your relations with the United States. You will get to know our methods and we shall gain the opportunity to see what results may be obtained when our methods are applied to large-scale problems’ (Sułek, 2010). Lazarsfeld was confident that empirical social research —what he called ‘concrete sociology’ — would leave its mark in Poland. Colleagues in the US shared the sociologist’s enthusiasm for the rapid developments in Polish sociology (Lazarsfeld, 1970). Twenty-four other American scholars made similar visits to Poland on Ford grants during the years of the program’s operation (FFA, 1963. R2517, G57-322).

Closing the Door on the Ford Foundation

The Ford Foundation’s initiative was correctly perceived by the Polish authorities to be the realization of US State Department policy. However, the new leadership was positively inclined towards the United States, with which it had just initiated trade and loan negotiations. Although Polish authorities deplored the ‘national Communism’ rhetoric adopted by Dulles, American policy was understood as a sign of support for the events of October 1956 (Wandycz, 1980).

At the outset of 1957, the Central Committee’s main interest in the US was obtaining assistance to restart the nation’s faltering economy. That year, however, marked a steady drift away from the spirit of liberalism that had accompanied Gomulka’s rise to power. At the Tenth Plenum of
the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) in October 1957, an important member of academia stated that ‘academic freedom . . . is not equivalent with the Party letting its grip on culture abate’(Archiwum Akt Nowych, 1957, Akta PZPR, sygnatura III / 22). The fear in New York was that Gomułka would either fall victim to a Soviet-backed coup or use Stalinist methods to secure his grip on power. Both scenarios would mean the end of the embryonic exchange program (FFA, 1957, R1062, G57-477).

The sheer popularity of the program meant that the Polish authorities soon appreciated the importance of exerting maximum influence on the selection process. The Foundation’s money was to be invested in individuals with the ‘appropriate moral and political outlook,’ who would use their newly acquired knowledge to advance the progress of Peoples’ Poland (AAN. 1960. Akta MSzW, sygnatura 317/525). The MHE was of the opinion that the ten per cent or so of Party members who were selected by the Ford Foundation were a smokescreen for the numerous ‘revisionists’ receiving grants who would work against Polish state interests (FFA, 1960 R1062, G57-477). Further, some Marxist intellectuals, most notably Zygmunt Bauman, voiced the opinion that by uncritically ‘giving in’ to American sociology, intellectuals were making it more difficult in Poland to construct a Marxist one (Bauman, 1961). Although this criticism was directed towards his fellow sociologists rather than the intellectual exchange program, it resonated within the corridors of the MHE.

Ford Foundation representatives, accustomed to an American political model, at first called on contacts at the MHE and sympathetic members of the Polish parliament to resolve arising disputes. However, in the Peoples’ Republic, real power was concentrated in the Central Committee of the ruling party, and the CC actively evaluated ideologically sensitive applications to decide who would be allowed to travel west (Pleskot, 2010). Professor Adam Schaff, the Marxist dialectician and chair of the CC’s Education Commission, was increasingly on Stone’s radar as networks of power within the Polish system became more apparent (FFA, 1958, R1062, G57-477).

In private conversations with Stone, Schaff would continue to insist on his support for the program on the terms agreed upon in 1957 (FFA, 1958, R1062, G57-477). But at the Twelfth Plenum of the CC in October 1958, Schaff spoke of the need for ‘correct control of our scientific and cultural exchanges’. His remarks were leaked and conveyed to the IA through the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Schaff’s recommendation for an ‘effective institution, which could take upon itself the organization and control of cultural and scientific exchange in the interest of the state’ was understood to mean that the Ford Foundation was to be stripped of its prerogatives (AAN. 1958. Akta PZPR, sygnatura III / 24).

On 15 November 1960, the weekly Polityka disclosed official discontent with American philanthropy in an article entitled, ‘Come, Child, I Shall Pay for You . . .’. It argued that ‘the system of recruitment [of the Ford Foundation] had occasioned many reservations because the representatives
of the Foundation were motivated by certain political considerations'. It resurrected the old claim that ‘too many people have gone abroad to study humanities . . . which was not the most rational way of using money offered to [Poland] by foreign foundations’. The article noted that out of 253 Ford Foundation scholarships, 56 per cent were for scholars in the humanities, as opposed to 32.5 per cent for those involved in economic, technical, and physical sciences combined (FFA, 1960, R2517, G57-322). Reporting on the changing atmosphere, the New York Times published an article on 19 November announcing that ‘the Polish Government has imposed new controls on private United States fellowship programs’ (NYT, 1960).

By early 1961, the Polish government had made it clear that the MHE’s ‘support would be given in fullest measure to candidates on their list’, with the implication that independent candidates would face difficulties. The Ford Foundation received information that ‘word had gone out that there was ‘no point’ to submitting an application without state approval’ (FFA, 1961, R2517, G57-322). The government’s list for that year featured individuals from industry, technology, economic planning, and the natural sciences, despite the Foundation’s continuing emphasis on the humanities and social sciences. In early 1962, the Poles stipulated that the Ford Foundation ‘would not communicate in any way with [its] tentative selections until they were approved in a final sense by the Ministry of Higher Education’ (FFA, 1962 R2517, G57-322). This unilateral compromise of the principles of the established agreement, in which the Foundation was free to contact whom it wished, sealed the fate of the program. No selection team was dispatched for 1962-1963, and the program was suspended indefinitely.

At the final tally in February 1961, 330 Poles had been selected by the Ford Foundation to travel west.

Reasons for the Suspension

In the wake of the 1962 suspension of activities in Poland, intellectuals and officials assured its representatives in private that they would soon be permitted to operate again under the terms of the original agreement (FFA, 1962 R2517, G57-322). But the official Polish position had shifted. Changing winds from the East played a role in the suspension. In 1956, the Kremlin had been willing to barter strict control over Polish interior affairs in exchange for stability in what was for the Russians a crucial buffer zone against Western encroachment. As the destabilizing events of that year receded into memory, however, Moscow became increasingly dissatisfied with Americans ‘running around as if in their own backyard’ in Poland. The Russians also drew a contrast with the Foundation’s operations in Yugoslavia, where Belgrade retained full control of scholarship recipients, and ensured that only loyal Party members were selected (Wiatr, 2010).

At the outset of the sixties, the Polish United Workers Party grew increasingly hostile to intellectual fervour within its ranks and beyond. Gomułka, coming from a tradition of Communists who emphasized the power of words, deplored what he called ‘tubercular revisionism’ spreading within literary and academic
circles. Falling back on a time-tested trope, Gomułka blamed foreign agents. At a party meeting devoted to ‘ideological struggle’ in July 1963, the Party Secretary stated that the authorities had uncovered ‘efforts aiming at ideological penetration’, using scholarships ‘for stimulating bourgeois and revisionist trends in the arts and sciences’. The leader assured his audience that ‘these activities had been put to an end’ (AAN, 1963, Akta KC PZPR, sygnatura 1255, 82-83).

The Reverberations

Upon returning home from Poland in 1958, Professor Charles Frankel recalled hearing that the country ‘rests on three pillars: The Catholic Church, Gomułka, and the Ford Foundation’ (FFA, 1958 R2517, G57-322). While inflated, this evaluation of the Ford Foundation’s influence in the East Bloc country nonetheless pointed to an undeniable reality. The exchange program’s impact on the development of the Polish intellectual milieu in the post-Stalinist decade was tangible, if in somewhat unexpected ways.

Polish sociology was the field most significantly affected by the cross-cultural opportunities afforded by the Foundation, diversifying and developing sub-disciplines. Stefan Nowak is an emblematic example. A recipient of a 1958 grant, Nowak spent that year studying with Lazarsfeld at Columbia University, and subsequently taught seminars on empirical sociology at Warsaw University. Among the Polish students who flocked to his classes, the sociologist popularized ‘American’ methodological terminology, including a ‘new language of social research’—the language of theoretical and working hypotheses, concepts and indices’. In 1964, Nowak published Method of Sociological Research, a Polish-language collection of texts by American authors on research methods. Nowak’s questionnaire, studying the social ideology of Warsaw’s students achieved international acclaim, with Lazarsfeld commenting on it in his own works (Sulek, 2009).

The US influence was also evident in Łódź, which had supplanted Warsaw as the centre for Polish sociology in the aftermath of World War II. Zygmunt Gostkowski and Jan Lutyński, who had worked as Ford grantees in Seattle, Berkeley, New York, and Chicago, laid the foundations for ‘the Łódź School of empirical methodology’. Both were heavily influenced by the work they observed across the Atlantic, and the school they established set the foundations for the development of survey research in Poland (Sulek, 2010).

Andrzej Malewski and Jan Szczepański are two other notable examples. After thirteen months training at Columbia and Berkeley between 1959-1960, Malewski returned to Poland and established the field social psychology. His colleague Szczepański joined empiricism and Marxism in his work, most notably in La Sociologie Marxiste Empirique, published in France. The rise of Marxist empirical sociology opened Marxism to US methodology (Sulek, 2010)10. Lazarsfeld confirmed this view: ‘It is the younger generation of Communist scholars which promotes and carries out work in concrete sociology. The so-called de-Stalinization accounts for much of this development, although increasing contact with Western
sociologists plays a role. At the moment a number of Communist governments give relatively more support to empirical social research than do some Western countries’ (Lazarsfeld, 1970).

The older generation of Polish sociologists, trained in the pre-war logical-empiricist Lvov school, were more critical of modern American sociological methodology. Stanisław Ossowski, the distinguished Polish academic who travelled to the United States in 1958 on a Ford scholarship, is a good example of the resistance to US sociology among this generation of Polish scholars. The left-leaning Ossowski was never a PUWP member or a Communist, but he deplored empirical sociologists’ fascination with the natural sciences, and believed that its increasing presence in Polish sociology was detrimental (Sułek 2010).

Jan Szczepański, his younger colleague, eventually came to agree. In the decade after 1956, Polish social scientists pursued diverse research methods to analyse problems including changing social structures. But focusing on current issues meant that little attention was given to the development of general theory. Empirical studies were critiqued for their narrow range; little ‘exploratory value was seen, and the potential for broader implications of the findings was questioned’. At the same time, applications of empirical methods bore meagre relevance for the ‘social engineering’ that it was hoped sociology would achieve (Kraśko, 2010). It is a telling detail of this chapter in cultural diplomacy that resistance to the Americanization of the social sciences was most audible not from the Marxists, but rather from the Polish pre-war positivist circle.

Beyond its local implications, the Americanization of Polish sociology facilitated the dissemination of modern Western thought in the other countries of the East Bloc. With harsher censorship and no programs comparable in scale to the Ford initiative in Poland, the other peoples’ democracies had little direct access to the West. Yet many of the Polish books influenced by the contemporary American social science of the 1960s were translated into Czech and Russian, and circulated in those countries (Sułek 2010). Ford Foundation scholars returned to Poland with new friends in important academic centres. Contacts allowed for a fruitful exchange of ideas in the years to come, the rich correspondence between historian Andrzej Walicki and Isaiah Berlin of Oxford being one example. In later decades, talented students of former Ford Foundation scholars found that recommendations from their professors opened doors at US universities (Walicki, 2005).

Erudite works such as Jan Kott’s Shakespeare, Our Contemporary, or Zbigniew Herbert’s A Barbarian in the Garden, would simply not have been written without grants affording the authors the opportunity to travel and the time and liberty to compose.

Parallel to its impact on the humanities, the exchange program increased understanding of American life, its politics, and its popular attitudes. In 1962 alone, seven books by Ford grantees about the US appeared in Poland. Later publications, such as Józef Chałasiński’s American Culture and Jan Strzelecki’s American Anxieties, enjoyed broad interest from Polish readers (Sulek, 2010).

Influential public figures also benefited from a better understanding
of their counterparts across the Atlantic. Mieczysław Rakowski, editor in chief of the Polish Weekly *Polityka* who came to the US in 1962 on a Ford grant, recalled being impressed by the Foundation’s thoughtful selection process. The eventual First Secretary of the PUWP credited far-sighted political strategists at the State Department (Ordyński and Szlajfer, 2009). During his stay Rakowski learned that the average US citizen was not particularly preoccupied with the race to the moon, enjoyed a working luncheon with the editors of the *New York Times*, and discussed the Cuban Missile Crisis with Walter Rostov. An informal meeting with President John F. Kennedy was an exceptional privilege bestowed on the young journalist, which underscored the great interest and attention that was shown visitors from behind the Iron Curtain at this early stage in postwar relations (Rakowski, 1998).

**Conclusion**

The Ford Foundation’s initiative in Poland was premised on the conviction that peaceful, incremental reform was superior to violent revolution in transforming the Soviet sphere of influence. The theory of convergence, elaborated by Western sociologists in the 1950s, was a key point of reference for policy. It was assumed that in the future, Communist societies would face similar challenges as liberal democracies, and would have to find solutions or enact reforms in order to overcome them. Accordingly, the most fertile ground in the Marxist camp for the germination of the positivist kernels that might accelerate this process was located in the re-emerging Polish social sciences. The influence of the Foundation’s program on sociology was unparalleled, although the transplantation of a method from across the Atlantic in the absence of a general theory proved to limit its full impact. But the numerous publications from Ford Foundation recipients in the humanities are testament to the program’s wider impressions.

For the scholars and artists emerging from the Stalinist dogma, the subsequent stimulus had lasting effects on both mind and spirit. Once back in Poland, many Ford Foundation grantees joined the swelling ranks of disillusioned intellectuals forming an opposition to the government. In the context of a system in which every accolade was granted by the State, the distinction bestowed by the American foundation and the interest shown to the grant recipients by influential figures in the West helped endure official ostracism. On the other hand, those who continued to hew to the Party line were inclined to treat the social order as nothing more than a geopolitical necessity.

In conclusion, the Ford Foundation played an important role in helping the Polish intelligentsia wrest itself from the ideological straightjacket of Stalinism, laying down the groundwork for a process of intellectual integration of Western thought that would effectively continue up to the systemic transformation in Poland.

**Notes**

1. ‘The Satellite peoples feel themselves to be living under a foreign occupation,’ the note stated, ‘at least, under a hostile regime. Whereas the people of the Soviet
Union see in free exchange a promise of the removal of the threat of war . . . the peoples of the Satellite states would see in freer exchange a promise of the alteration of the fundamental conditions under which they live.’ Large parts of what follows have been published by this author in another text entitled

2 US foundations were not always independent from federal agencies. See Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

3 Between 12 and 14 March, 1957, Stone met the following officials in Washington: Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bowie, Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on East-West Relations William Lacy, Director of the East-West Staff Frederick Merrill, Henry Leverich of the East European Desk at the State Department, Deputy Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs C. Douglas Dillon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, US Ambassador to the USSR Charles E. Bohlen, Senator John F. Kennedy, and head of the CIA Allen Dulles. All expressed support for the Ford Foundation program with Poland. Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter informed Stone that he ‘strongly favored a Foundation exchange program with Poland.’ The US Ambassador to the USSR, Charles Bohlen, was ‘somewhat surprised at the extent of the Polish request.’ Mindful of the fact that ‘the Kremlin was aware of the anti-USSR attitudes in Poland and was watching carefully all Polish attempts to make contacts with and obtain support from the West,’ he urged the Foundation to ‘keep in close touch with the East European Desk at the State Department.’

4 Stone’s contact with the State Department had practical consequences. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, members of Communist Parties were not issued visas to the United States. However, the Ford Foundation was committed to selecting its candidates based on intellectual merit. Omitting Communist intellectuals would invite the accusation that the process was politicized. In March 1957, Merrill assured Stone that the ‘Attorney General will automatically grant waivers’ for Communists selected by the foundation. In return, the IA office would provide information about Communists for whom the Foundation was seeking waivers. (Stone to Central Files, CM, 8 March 1957. FAA, R1062, G57-477.)

5 Face-to-face interviews with candidates or their promoters were an important component of the selection process. Stone and his men spent weeks at a time traveling ‘over bad roads, in unfortunate cars that showed up hours late, over 2,000 kilometers of Poland to various cities.’ While the evaluation of potential grant recipients from academia was generally straightforward and based on publications and interviews, advice and letters of support were essential when it came to artists. Stone was in close contact with the head of the Polish Writers’ Union Antoni Słonimski. Among members recommended by the Union were the Polish poet Alexander Wat, who was also backed by letters from author Ignazio Silone and Konstanty Jeleński, of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Jan Józef Lipski, the literary critic and Warsaw Uprising hero who became a key opposition figure in post-Stalinist Poland, was another important contact for Stone.

6 The caliber of the Polish intellectuals traveling west was unanimously praised by their counterparts in the United States. The evaluation of participants was
generally ‘highly favorable.’ ‘Brilliant young scholar,’ and ‘gracious, learned and charming’ were typical descriptions. Another characteristic report applauded a Polish visiting professor who had ‘not only contributed a great deal in his activities at Columbia, but [became] . . . an important ‘friend at court’ back in Poland in helping . . . to develop further cultural exchanges.’ (IIE, ‘Polish Exchange Program of the Ford Foundation: Year End Program Report, July, 1958.’ FFA, R2519, G57-322.) Reactions were equally encouraging in Western European academic circles. Working with the young sociologist Zygmunt Bauman at the London School of Economics had been ‘one of the most rewarding academic experiences … despite his rigid Marxist background,’ one professor recalled. (McKenzie to The British Council, ‘Report on Ford Foundation Scholars.’ FFA, R530, G57-321).

Other American sociologists traveling to Poland on Ford grants included Edward Shils, Charles Wright Mills, and Seymour Lipset.

Po Prostu had supported the First Secretary with publications from leading Polish intellectuals of the Left. Machcewicz, Rebellious Satellite.

Schaff retains a mixed legacy: an adherent of the party line during Stalinism, he was responsible for the marginalization in Polish academia of many leading pre-war humanities professors; yet his policies permitted them to study in private and retain their salaries, which was more than could be said for their colleagues in neighboring countries.

Julian Hochfeld, the Marxist sociologist and PUWP member, in his review of Paul Lazarsfeld’s The Language of Social Research, was polemical but sympathetic.

In 1964, thirty-four prominent intellectuals signed a petition written by Lipski against censorship, in what was the first important act of dissent since 1956. Nine signatories on the List of 34 were Ford grant recipients: Jerzy Andrzejewski, Stanisław Dygat, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Julian Krzyżanowksi, Jan Kott, Edward Lipiński, Maria Ossowska, Jan Szczepański, and Władysław Tatarkiewicz.

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